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Abstract
Jacks et al. (2011) offer an alternative to price gaps to quantify trade costs. Implementing a method
which consists in deducing international trade costs from trade flows, they argue that the reduction in
trade costs was the main driving force of trade growth during the first globalization (1870-1913), whereas
economic expansion was the main driving force during the second globalization (1950-2000). We argue
that this important result is driven by the use of an ad hoc aggregation method. What Jacks et al. (2011)
capture is the difference in the relative starting trade of dyads experiencing faster trade growth in the
first and second globalization. More generally, we cast doubts on the possibility to reach conclusions of
such nature with a method that infers trade costs from trade flows, and then uses these costs to explain
trade flows. We argue that it can only rephrase the information already contained in openness ratios.
Keywords: Trade costs, globalization, gravity model, aggregation, structure effect.
JEL Code: F14, N70
1 Introduction
Jacks and his coauthors offer in several papers a method for inferring international trade costs from trade
flows.1 Using the general equilibrium model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), they calculate trade costs
(defined as all barriers to trade, notably transportation and transaction costs) and their evolution during the
first and second waves of globalization (1870-1913 and 1950-2000) as well as the interwar period (1921-1939)
thanks to the impressive set of data they collected on trade flows, GDP and exports between 27 countries2.
∗Corresponding author: guillaume.daudin@dauphine.fr
1The method is developed in Jacks et al. (2008), Jacks et al. (2010), Novy (2009) and Jacks et al. (2011). We will use this
latter paper as a reference
2Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. The data contain 130 country pairs.
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They provide a decomposition of the growth of trade caused by the reduction in trade costs and economic
expansion. They use their computations to underline a difference of nature between the two globalizations:
“Our results assign an overarching role for our trade cost measure in the nineteenth century and
the interwar trade bust. In contrast, when explaining the post-World War II trade boom, we
identify a more muted role for the trade cost measure.” (p. 196).
This is potentially an important result that sheds light on the globalization processes. However, that result
is actually driven by an ad hoc method of aggregation that captures structure effects. The inferred difference
between the two globalization comes from the fact that the dyads with the fastest growing trade in the first
wave of globalization start with very small trade. This is not the case in the second wave of globalization.
Using a three-countries version of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)’s model for the aggregation of bilateral
trade costs shows that there was no difference in nature between the two globalizations. More generally,
we cast doubt on the possibility to distinguish the effect of trade costs and economic expansion through an
approach that relies only on the study of trade flows. Deducing trade costs from trade flows, and then using
trade costs to explain trade flows is essentially a circular reasoning. Therefore, Jacks et al.’s approach cannot
be an alternative to traditional investigations of impediments to trade, such as commodity price gaps.
This paper starts by presenting Jacks et al.’s approach of the measure of trade costs, and insists on its
relevance at the bilateral level to control for multilateral trade barriers in gravity regressions (section 2).
It then highlights that the result on a difference of nature between the two globalizations is paradoxical
since it cannot be deduced from a comparison of the evolution of openness ratios. Section 3 shows that the
conclusion is only driven by the authors’ ad hoc aggregation method. We propose a microfounded way to
aggregate trade costs and the puzzle fades away. Section 4 explores the reasons why Jacks et al.’s aggregation
technique ends up providing different results for the two globalizations. We argue that what Jacks et al.
misleadingly attribute to unequal trade costs decreases between the two globalizations is instead a difference
in the distribution of trade growth over trading partners.
2 Deducing trade costs from trade flows, explaining trade flows
with trade costs
Although it is consistent with many models of international trade, Jacks, Meissner and Novy’s work is
primarily based on the general equilibrium model framework of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). n
countries, each represented by a maximizing consumer, exchange goods over one single period. In this
Armington world, production is not modelized3 and each country is initially endowed with a differentiated
representative good. Trade occurs because of consumers’ taste for diversity. The preferences of all countries
are assumed to be identical and modelized by a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) use this model to microfound gravity equations and solve Mc Callum
(1995)’s border puzzle by highlighting that bilateral trade does not depend on bilateral trade barriers per
se, but bilateral trade barriers relative to impediments to trade with all other trading partners. Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) show that the equilibrium imposes the following relation:
xij =
yiyj
yW
(
tij
PiPj
)1−σ
(1)
where xij are real exports from i to j, yi is real output of country i, yW is the world real output, σ is
the elasticity of substitution, Pi is the price index in country i and can be interpreted as multilateral trade
barriers, and tij is the trade costs factor between i and j. Trade costs factors are assumed to be symmetric,
i.e. tij = tji.
Jacks et al. first depart from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) by eliminating the multilateral resistance
variable (PiPj) from the gravity equation. Following Novy (2009), bilateral trade barriers are not considered
3In the working paper version of Jacks et al. (2010), the authors provide a version of the model with production. The key
equation is identical to the one of the model without production.
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relative to multilateral trade barriers modelized by the price index, but to domestic trade costs. In this case,
trade flows are no longer compared to outputs, but to internal trade xii4. The equation above becomes:
(
xiixjj
xijxji
) 1
2(σ−1)
=
(
tijtji
tiitjj
) 1
2
= 1 + τij (2)
The last equality defines τij , the geometric mean of trade costs from country i to j and j to i relative
to intra-national trade costs in countries i and j (no assumption of symmetry of bilateral trade costs is
imposed). It is the trade cost measure used by the authors.
This simple step offers a significant breakthrough in the microfoundations of gravity equations.
Comparing bilateral trade flows to intranational trade allows to integrate Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003)’s caveat against omitted variable bias while getting rid of multilateral trade barriers. This is
important when multilateral trade barriers cannot be estimated, e.g. when we only have data on trade
for one country. Jacks et al. (2011) take advantage of this feature in the fifth section of their article in
regressing their measure of trade costs between two countries on a set of proxies for trade costs, such as the
distance between trade partners, tariffs, or the volatility of the exchange rate. This is a very useful approach.
However, Jacks, Meissner and Novy also suggest in their article that Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)’s
model can be used to move away from the gravity regression approach. Instead of explaining trade flows by
observable proxies for costs, they quantify the impact of all impediments to trade: “We, therefore, infer trade
costs from trade flows. This approach allows us to capture the combined magnitude of tariffs, transport costs,
and all other macroeconomic frictions that impede international market integration but which are inherently
difficult to observe. We emphasize that this approach of inferring trade costs from readily available trade data
holds clear advantages for applied research: the constraints on enumerating — let alone, collecting data on
— every individual trade cost element even over short periods of time makes a direct accounting approach
impossible.” (p.131).
Our point is that a method that uses trade flows alone can teach us much about their determinants.
When departing from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)’s multilateral resistances, the arbitrage condition
Jacks et al. base their computation on is an equality between a Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) and
a price ratio for a CES utility function, or more precisely the product of two such equalities, one from
the program of each trade partner. Appendix A derives equation (2) this way without passing through
multilateral resistance. The inference of trade costs from trade flows is tantamount to using the relation
between quantities and prices given by a demand curve derived from fully specified exogenous preferences.
This is of course no reason in itself to disregard the method. Yet it cannot be used to answer “the
central question of what drives trade booms and busts”(p. 186) as the authors do in section 6 of their article,
because the reasoning is circular: first calculate trade costs from trade flows, then explain trade flows from
the inferred trade costs.
Formally, the authors take the logarithm of the key equation of their article (2) to decompose the product
of bilateral trade flows between i and j in four terms:
ln(xijxji) = 2ln(yi + yj) + ln(sisj) + 2(1− σ)ln(1 + τij) +
(
xiixjj
yiyj
)
(3)
Where si = yi/(yi + yj). By calculating the GDP-weighted average of the evolution of these terms over
the first and second globalizations, the authors attribute the evolution of trade flows to four components:
output growth, increasing income similarity, changes in trade costs and a fourth term that can be interpreted
as a trade diversion effect.
Since the trade costs measure is assimilated to trade flows relative to domestic activity, they simply
restate an information already contained in any measure of trade flows relative to economic size, like an
openness ratio defined for instance as the ratio of exportations to GDP. However the main conclusion in
4Due to data limitations, the authors use the relation xii = GDPi − EXPORTSi to get internal trade. We follow them.
Concerns about the fact that GDP is measured in added-value and exportations as gross value are addressed in appendix B of
Jacks et al. (2011).
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Jacks et al.’s article, namely that the first globalization was driven more by the decrease in trade costs than
the second one, requires the absence of circularity. Indeed, when we decompose the level of exportations of a
country as the product of its GDP and its openness ratio, we find results that are different from theirs (see
table 1).5 The increase in exportations is mainly explained by GDP growth for the large majority of the
27 countries in the data. On average, this decomposition attributes 74% (183/246) of the growth in trade
to the increase in GDP in the second globalization and 60% in the first globalization. This is very much in
contrast to Jacks et al.6 :
“For the pre-World War I period, we find that declines in the trade cost measure explain roughly
60% of the growth in global trade. [...] Conversely, we find that only 31% of the present-day
global trade boom can be explained by the decline in the trade cost measure. [...] The contribution
of the two trade booms suggests that major technological breakthrough in the nineteenth century
such as the steamship, the telegraph, and refrigeration may have been relatively more important
than technological innovations in the second half of the twentieth century such as containerization
and enhanced handling facilities.” (p. 186).
This contrast between both decompositions of the growth of exports is at the center of the argument by
Jack et al. As the next section shows, it is actually driven by the ad hoc way they aggregate trade costs.
3 Ad hoc aggregation of trade costs
Jacks et al.’s conclusion on a difference of nature between the two globalizations is based on an aggregate
trade costs measure that provides a summary statistic of the evolution of trade costs across all dyads in the
sample, as well as for different regions of the world. To move from bilateral costs τij to an aggregate measure
of trade costs, the authors use an arithmetic mean over dyads, weighted by the sum of the GDP of the two
trade partners.
There is no justification for this aggregation method. We argue that all the results they reach that are
not a reformulation of the evolution of the openness ratio during the two globalizations come from this
aggregation method.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)’s model can be used to calculate the aggregate trade costs a single
country faces in its trade with all its trading partners. Indeed, using a two-countries model where all trade
partners of country i are treated as one single country provides an aggregate measure of trade costs that does
not rely on any ad hoc aggregation method but instead on microfoundations. Since all trade flows data are
not available, it is also possible to use a three-countries model, with country i, its trading partners present
in the data, and the rest of the world.
Let us note υi the corresponding trade cost faced by country i with all its trading partners in the data.
Its expression is given by Jacks et al.’s key equation (2) applied to a three-countries model:
1 + υi =
(
xiixpp
xipxpi
) 1
2(σ−1)
(4)
where xip and xpi are respectively real exports and imports of i from and to its trade partners in the
data, and xpp is the volume of trade within and between the trading partners present in the data. This
‘domestic trade’ variable now includes cross-border trade.
Using this measure of trade costs, we provide the same decomposition in four terms of the increase in
trade flows during the two globalizations as in the authors’ article for the countries with the most trade
partners available in the data (France (24), the UK (25), the USA (23)). We also provide the unweighted
and end-of-period-GDP-weighted averages for all countries in the sample. Results are displayed in tables 2
5We follow the authors in interpreting log differences as percentages. However, one should keep in mind that given the size
of the changes, this is a very inexact approximation.
6Contributions of growth in income similarity and of change in multilateral factors are negative.
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First Globalization 1870-1913 Second Globalization 1950-2000
Exports GDP Openness Ratio Exports GDP Openness Ratio
Argentina 292 251 40 116 132 -16
Austria 89 102 -13 379 185 194
Australia 174 152 22 114 191 -77
Belgium 195 86 109 251 150 101
Brazil 174 101 73 184 239 -55
Canada 233 170 64 258 192 66
Denmark 200 113 87 230 142 88
France 117 70 48 260 172 87
Germany 168 119 48 391 175 216
Greece 140 99 42 227 218 9
India 147 41 105 161 216 -54
Indonesia 220 87 133 263 232 31
Italy 151 83 69 335 188 147
Japan 337 104 233 448 281 167
Mexico 189 143 46 296 238 59
Netherlands 230 92 138 298 173 125
New Zealand 184 186 -2 307 133 174
Norway . . . 70 181 -111
Philippines 218 92 126 237 213 24
Portugal 74 57 17 319 208 111
Spain 171 76 96 496 230 266
Sri Lanka 172 92 81 39 201 -161
Sweden 150 92 58 240 134 106
Switzerland 105 108 -3 250 132 118
UK 125 81 44 196 122 74
Uruguay 261 165 96 48 94 -46
USA 208 166 42 241 170 72
Average 178 107 71 246 183 63
Table 1: Decomposition of the growth of exportations between GDP growth and Openness ratio growth,
log differences (interpreted as percentages). Figures for Norway are not given because the dissolution of the
union between Norway and Sweden (1905) makes them meaningless.
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1870-1913 Contribution
of growth in
output
Contribution
of growth in
income similarity
Contribution
of change in
trade cost measure
Contribution
of change in
multilateral factors
Average growth
of bilateral
trade flows
JMN 2011, unweighted
195 3 251 -14 435
JMN 2011, GDP-weighted
225 -11 290 -18 486
JMN by country, unweighted
France 154 24 168 -17 329
UK 168 18 122 -18 290
USA 312 -51 322 -15 568
Average 222 -7 263 -17 461
JMN by country, GDP-weighted
France 187 -1 151 -12 325
UK 194 3 102 -13 286
USA 286 -29 244 -11 490
Average 228 -9 295 -13 501
3 countries model
France 205 -30 84 -8 251
UK 204 -18 92 -9 269
USA 201 48 123 -8 364
Unweighted
average 206 3 128 -12 325
GDP-weighted
average 203 8 163 -9 365
Table 2: Decomposition of the growth in international trade (logarithms) with ad hoc averages and a
microfounded aggregation method. First wave of globalization, 1870-1913. JMN 2011 refers to the averaging
over dyads, JMN by country by country refers to the averaging over trading partners for one country, 3
countries model refers to the aggregation method we offer.
and 3 along with the results with the Jacks et al.’s method.7
Tables 2 and 3 highlight how much the decomposition between the decrease in trade costs and the income
growth depends on the aggregation technique. When we use the microfounded aggregation method,8 growth
in output is the main driving force behind both waves of growth in international trade, contributing to about
56% (203/365) in the first wave and 66% (361/545) in the second one. It is no coincidence if these results are
very similar to the ones in table 1: 60% (71/107) in the first globalization and 74% (183/246) in the second
one. Insofar as a measure of trade costs is defined residually as everything that explains differences between
domestic and international trade flows, it is bound to reword the information contained in an openness ratio.
7They include unweighted and end-of-period-GPD-weighted averages over country dyads of bilateral trade costs, such as
provided in Jacks et al. (2011). We also display for France, the UK and the USA the trade cost measure averaged over trading
partners faced by one country, as the results are presented (with a smaller data set) in Jacks et al. (2008, 2010). We also provide
both averages of this measure over all countries in the data set.
8We selected the (GDP-weighted) average of our measure in order to allow a clear comparison with Jacks et al.’s results.
There is of course no rational for such a summary statistic, but the results for France, the UK and the USA assure that the
main conclusion of this exercice does not depend on averaging over countries.
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1950-2000 Contribution
of growth in
output
Contribution
of growth in
income similarity
Contribution
of change in
trade cost measure
Contribution
of change in
multilateral factors
Average growth
of bilateral
trade flows
JMN 2011, unweighted
353 8 148 -25 484
JMN 2011, GDP-weighted
350 3 137 -17 473
JMN by country, unweighted
France 355 -1 201 -29 526
UK 280 29 54 -25 338
USA 343 11 112 -21 445
Average 349 9 124 -23 459
JMN by country, GDP-weighted
France 365 2 271 -21 617
UK 319 1 202 -20 502
USA 349 27 165 -16 525
Average 361 21 190 -19 553
3 countries model
France 371 -12 259 -16 602
UK 372 -59 122 -15 420
USA 372 -7 195 -12 548
Unweighted
average 343 11 116 -18 452
GDP-weighted
average 361 15 183 -14 545
Table 3: Decomposition of the growth in international trade (logarithms) with ad hoc averages and a
microfounded aggregation method. Second wave of globalization, 1950-2000.
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4 Sensitivity of the trade cost measure to structure effects
Our explanation of why Jacks et al.’s aggregate measure of trade costs yields different conclusion from table
1 is because it is sensitive to structure effects. To explain this idea, and for clarity purposes, let us consider
a word where partners are symmetric (domestic trade is equal in i and j and xij=xji). From equation 2,
we have:
1 + τij =
(
xii
xji
) 1
σ−1
(5)
This relation does not of course correspond to the arbitrage condition of country i, which would involve
supply prices, but our aim here is to highlight the mechanism behind Jacks et al.’s aggregation. Note aj
the arithmetic mean of aj over j (aj = 1/n
∑n
j=1 aj). One can then compare the unweighted average of τij
according to equation (5) and the measure derived from the three-countries model in equation (4):
1 + τi = x
1
σ−1
ii
(
x
1
1−σ
ji
)
(6)
1 + υi = x
1
σ−1
ii (n× xji)
1
1−σ (7)
Except for the factor n (which is irrelevant since we are concerned with the evolution of the trade costs
index) the two expressions (6) and (7) differ only by the mean they use. On the one hand, υi uses the
arithmetic mean of imports xji. On the other hand, τi, because it uses an arithmetic mean over τij , uses a
mean power 1/(1− σ) of the imports,
(
x
1
1−σ
ji
)1−σ
. Appendix B establishes that the curvature properties of
the function x→ x 11−σ , σ > 1 tend to draw the growth of τi towards the values of the growth of bilateral trade
costs incurred with small trading partners.9 On the contrary, υi puts more weight on big trade partners,
consistent with intuition and their higher share of imports.
The authors partly correct this biais in the average of τij by the use a end-of-period-GDP weighted
average. However, as tables 2 and 3 show, weighting by the GDP of trade partners, besides not being
theoretically justified, does not provide an accurate correction of the bias in the measure. One reason for
this failure is that the relationship between GDP and the importance of trade flows is not systematic.
The average of the bilateral trade costs τij captures both trade costs and the distribution of trade costs
relative to the size of the trading partners. Through time, if dyads with small starting trade experience faster
growth of trade than others, the decline of trade costs measured by τi will be overestimated compared to the
decline of υi. This fits the data. For both globalizations, figure 1 plots the growth of trade flows (measured
by ∆ln(√xijxji)) as a function of the initial value of trade (measured by the logarithm of the geometric
average of bilateral average ln(√xijxji)) for all dyads in the sample. This is also confirmed in the contrast
between the rate of growth of exports (table 1) and the rate of growth of bilateral trade flows (table 2 and
3), as export growth was relatively faster than bilateral trade growth in the first globalization compared to
the second (486/178 > 473/246). It confirms that the pairs of countries that initially traded little together
experienced faster growth of trade compared to other pairs in the first than in the second globalization. This
in an interesting result, but not the one presented by JMN.
5 Conclusion
Jacks, Meissner and Novy’s method for inferring trade costs from trade flows simply reformulates the evolu-
tion of the openness ratio when it is used to calculate aggregate trade costs. This is because it only relates
the two through an equality between MRS and price ratio. It appears more clearly when comparing the ad
9The ‘size’ of a country is used here to refer to the importance of the volume of its trade with i among trade partners of
country i, regardless of its population and GDP.
8
−
5
0
5
10
10 15 20 25 10 15 20 25
1870−1913 1950−2000
∆l
n(√
x i
jx
ji)
ln(√xijxji) (beginning of period)
Figure 1: Growth of trade flows (logarithms) depending on their initial value for the first (1870-1913) and
second (1950-2000) globalizations (logarithms).
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hoc aggregation of bilateral trade costs to an aggregated measure of trade costs based on Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003)’s model. Still, if their method fails to offer a full alternative to traditional investigations
of trade costs, such as commodity price gaps, it provides an improvement in the microfoundation of gravity
equations by substantially simplifying the way of correcting the omitted variable bias.
This characteristic of the proposed measure of trade costs is partly due to the all-inclusive definition of
trade costs used by the authors. In such a model, costs are anything that causes consumptions from different
countries’ products not to be equal. To be sure, it is essential to highlight that trade costs cannot be reduced
to tariffs or transportation costs, and to insist on the need for a quantification of all the impediments to
international trade. But the concept of trade costs loses part of its interest if there are no causal alternatives
to explain trade patterns. Such a definition is therefore bound to reword the information given by trade
flows relative to output, such as contained in an openness ratio.
A Appendix: Deducing the measure of trade costs from an equality
between a MRS and a price ratio
We derive in this appendix the key equation in Jacks et al. (2011). We do not start from Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003)’s results as we want to highlight it is an equality between MRS and price ratio, or more
precisely the product of two such equalities, one from the program of each trade partner.
Let us note Cki the consumption by country i of good from region k, σ the elasticity of substitution, and
βk a positive distribution parameter, preferences of countries i and j’s representative consumers are given
by their respective utility functions:
Ui =
(∑
k
β
1−σ
σ
k C
σ−1
σ
ki
) σ
σ−1
Uj =
(∑
k
β
1−σ
σ
k C
σ−1
σ
kj
) σ
σ−1
Trade costs imply that prices are specific to the country of consumption. We note pk the supply price of
the producer in country k net of trade costs, and pki the price of region k goods for region i consumers. We
define tki = pki/pk the trade costs factor between k and i. Jacks et al.’s variable of trade costs between k
and i, τki is then defined as the trade costs factor between k and i relative to the domestic trade costs factor
tii: τki = tki/tii − 1. In all that follows, we use the same notations τki for the geometric average of τki and
τik. Symmetry of bilateral trade costs does not need to be assumed.
Country i seeks to maximize Ui under the constraint
∑
k pkiCki = yi, where yi is the output of country
i. The first order conditions equate the Marginal Rates of Substitution (MRS) and the price ratio. In
particular, for the goods produced by i and j:
MRSji =
∂Ui
∂Cji
∂Ui
∂Cii
=
(
βj
βi
) 1−σ
σ
(
Cji
Cii
)− 1σ
=
pji
pii
Or equivalently with nominal values of trade flows, xji = pjiCii and xii = piiCii :
(
βj
βi
) 1−σ
σ
(
xji
xii
)− 1σ
=
(
pji
pii
)σ−1
σ
We take the power σ of this equation. Country k’s first-order optimality condition is given by a permu-
tation of the indexes. We hence have the system of equations:
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(
βj
βi
)1−σ (
xii
xji
)
=
(
pji
pii
)σ−1
(
βi
βj
)1−σ (
xjj
xij
)
=
(
pij
pjj
)σ−1
We can get rid of the βj coefficients by taking the side-by-side product of those two equations:
(
xiixjj
xijxji
)
=
(
pijpji
piipjj
)σ−1
The main insight from this derivation is that when introducing the trade costs variable τij , the exporter’s
supply prices disappear so that the trade cost factor can be expressed as a function of trade flows only. We
get the equation on which Jacks, Meissner and Novy base their analysis:
xijxji = (xiixjj)(1 + τij)
2(1−σ)
B Appendix: Properties of means and structure effects
Let φ be a continuous bijective function. We can define mφ the φ-mean of a sample (aj)1≤j≤n as the image
by φ−1 of the arithmetic mean of the image of the sample (φ(aj))1≤j≤n. A common case is when φ is a
power function x → xα. It includes the arithmetic (α = 1), quadratic (α = 2) and harmonic (α = −1)
means. Formally:
mφ = φ
−1
 1
n
n∑
j=1
φ(aj)

Properties of these means can be deduced from the monotonicity and convexity properties of the function
φ. For instance, if φ is convex, the convexity inequality gives:
φ(mφ) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
φ(aj) ≥ φ
 1
n
n∑
j=1
aj

If φ, and hence φ−1, is also increasing, the φ-mean is superior to the arithmetic mean. Intuitively, the
convexity of φ gives, relative to the arithmetic mean, more weight to the high values in the sample. Those
results are reversed if φ is concave and increasing or convex and decreasing. Jacks, Meissner and Novy’s
aggregation method of the τkj is tantamount to using a φ-mean with φ the power functions φ : x → x 11−ρ ,
ρ > 1 where the coherence with the model imposes an arithmetic mean. Hence, since φ is decreasing and
convex, the substitution tends to overweight small countries.
This is a static result. We are interested in the dynamic behavior of trade flows. But Jacks et al.’s
measure also overweights initially small trade partners in terms of the increase in trade flows. This can be
seen by calculating the elasticities to the importations from country k (ak) of the arithmetic mean (m) and
of Jacks et al.’s mean (mσ) (keeping importations from other trade partners aj constant). The elasticity of
a generic mean mσ to ak is given by εkmφ =
1
n
φ′(ak)
φ′(mφ)
ak
mφ
, so that:
εkm =
1
1 +
∑
j 6=k
aj/ak
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εkmσ =
1
1 +
∑
j 6=k
(aj/ak)
1
1−σ
The elasticity of the arithmetic mean m to ak is increasing in ak whereas the elasticity of mσ is decreasing
in ak. A one-percent increase in the importations from k increases more the arithmetic mean of importations
if k is initially an important importer, simply because k represents a larger part of trade. But it is the opposite
with mσ: the smaller the initial value of trade with k, the bigger the impact of its growth on mσ. Therefore,
Jacks et al.’s measure is biased toward the growth rates of costs incurred with small trade partners.
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